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Starting to Think
TJie Thinking Ape: the Evolutionary
Origins of Intelligence
by Richard Byrne, 1995.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 266 pp.
Mark Lake
Students of human evolution beware: despite a first
chapter berating the speculative nature of palaeo-
anthropology, this book is not about the evolution of
the modern mind. It is — exactly as the sub-title
suggests — about the evolutionary origins of intelli-
gence. Intelligence is of course a slippery concept,
but insofar as Byrne takes it to be the ability to adapt
to unpredictability and change using mentally rep-
resented information, then the subject matter of this
book is largely pre-human, and indeed pre-hominid.
This does not mean that The Thinking Ape is irrel-
evant to those who wish to explain the evolution of
the modern mind: such an endeavour can only ben-
efit from knowledge of the ancestral condition and
its evolutionary history. It is, however, unfortunate
that Byrne opens his book with a claim that much of
palaeoanthropology is 'simply not science' and that
as a result we will never know with confidence much
of what happened in the last five million years of
human evolution. This might suggest to the unwary
reader that the 'comparative method' used by Byrne
can provide reliable information about human evo-
lution: in fact Byrne makes no such claim. Conse-
quently, although one can argue with Byrne's bleak
assessment of the usefulness of palaeoanthropology,
it is more constructive that Tlie TJtinkingApe be judged
first and foremost for what it tells us about the start-
ing point, rather than the course of human evolu-
tion. In this respect it is essential reading.
The TJiinking Ape is structured around a method
which Byrne claims can reliably inform us about
some of the mental abilities possessed by the last
common ancestor of the extant great apes and
hominids. Essentially this involves three stages. The
first (Chapter 2) is to reconstruct the evolutionary
history of extant primates by applying the method
of cladistics to molecular markers. The second stage
is to find reliable differences between the intelli-
gence of the living species. This requires some no-
tion of intelligence and what it is for (Chapter 3),
which equips Byrne to look in depth at learning
(Chapters 4-6) and insight (Chapters 7-11) in mon-
keys and apes. The final stage is to map the differ-
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ences in intelligence onto the evolutionary history
established in Chapter 2, and then by 'reversing'
cladistic analysis to establish an evolutionary tax-
onomy of intelligence (Chapter 15). Byrne attempts
to explain this taxonomy by testing (Chapter 14)
whether environmental (Chapter 12) or social (Chap-
ter 13) selection pressures best account for the origin
of enhanced primate intelligence.
The primate evolutionary history presented in
Chapter 2 of The Thinking Ape contains no surprises
for those already familiar with the findings from
molecular taxonomy. Byrne places the ape-monkey
divergence at 30 My ago followed by a succession of
divergences until the human and chimpanzee ances-
tors part company at 6.2-6.7 My ago. These results
are well known, but Byrne's discussion of the meth-
ods used to obtain them is unusually clear. His dis-
cussion of the cladistic method is particularly helpful
in that he is careful to distinguish between establish-
ing the evolutionary taxonomy of extant species and
reconstructing the evolutionary origins of specific
phenotypic traits. Once the relationships between
modern species have been established from derived
(new) characters that are extremely unlikely to have
evolved more than once it is then possible to run the
method in 'reverse' and use the distribution of
phenotypic characters in modern species to deduce
those of extinct ancestors. As already noted, The
Thinking Ape is structured around the application of
exactly this two-pronged approach.
Establishing the distribution of intelligence in
modern primates requires a suitable operational defi-
nition of intelligence. Byrne is forced to develop his
own since there is no adequate precedent: psycho-
metrics seeks to measure intelligence differences be-
tween individuals, while developmental psychology,
which is concerned with commonalities within spe-
cies, has encountered numerous difficulties. Byrne's
own background in cognitive psychology is reflected
in his focus on thinking about what animals must be
doing mentally to produce observed behaviours. He
suggests that intelligence must involve an animal's
ability to (i) gain knowledge from interactions with
the environment and other individuals, (ii) use that
knowledge to organize effective behaviour in famil-
iar and novel contexts, and (iii) in some cases put
together separate pieces of knowledge to create novel
action. Accordingly the core of The Thinking Ape is
an assessment of how animals, especially primates,
gain knowledge (learn) and how they use that knowl-
edge (insight).
The traditional model of knowledge gain dis-
tinguishes between individual learning, imitation and
insight. Individual learning is an associative process
in which an animal records correlations among what
it perceives in the world and the results of its own
exploration. Such learning is widespread and prob-
ably has little to tell us about the special mental
abilities of monkeys and apes, although as Byrne
notes, individual learning is genetically channelled
to provide useful (adaptive) information. Social ani-
mals often appear to learn from the individual learn-
ing of other animals. Such social learning is widespread
among monkeys and apes: the classic example is the
spread of potato-washing among a population of
Japanese macaque monkeys. It used to be assumed
that all social learning occurred by a process of imi-
tation, but in many cases this is now doubted. Byrne
stresses that true imitation requires copying of novel
actions which are not already present in the behav-
ioural repertoire of the learner. In contrast, other
forms of social learning, such as stimulus enhance-
ment, response facilitation and emulation, merely
serve to direct normal associative learning and there-
fore cannot build up truly novel behaviours. The
particular significance of true imitation for intelli-
gence is that, at minimum, it requires the learner to
take the model's geometrical perspective, and in some
cases to know the model's intention. In a welcome
clarification of the debate engendered by Tomasello el
al. (1993) Byrne labels the first of these 'impersona-
tion' and the second 'program-level imitation'. Al-
though several species, including parrots and
dolphins, appear to be capable of impersonation,
only great apes provide evidence of program-level
imitation.
Insight is less about how an animal gains knowl-
edge and more about what it can do with the knowl-
edge it has. Byrne discusses knowledge about
physical events and then, at somewhat greater length,
knowledge about other animals. Understanding the
cause and effect between physical events, or simply
'how things work' requires a knowledge of the prop-
erties of objects and the relationships between them,
and this in turn requires a representation of objects
as enduring entities which still exist when not in
view. Byrne tentatively suggests that apes acquire a
concept of object permanence early in their develop-
ment, but that monkeys do not acquire this until
much later. If so this might explain why object play
is well documented in apes but (with the exception
of capuchins) largely lacking in monkeys. Object play
is especially interesting because it appears to be
closely connected with tool use. Tool use occurs in
many species, but only a few learn to use a range of
tools for a range of purposes and choose between
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methods; those that do (the great apes and capuchin
monkeys) are the very same species which engage in
object play. Furthermore, it appears that instances of
genuine problem-solving by great apes depend on
'noticing a solution when it comes by, not calculat-
ing it by some logical process'. Consequently suc-
cessful problem-solving depends upon having a large
repertoire of past experiences, and one way of build-
ing this up is by play. It is perhaps no coincidence
that in the wild only common chimpanzees regu-
larly invest much time in object play, and that it is
they who also exhibit the most extensive tool use.
Byrne draws attention to the enigma that all (but
probably only) the great apes have the mental capac-
ity to use objects to solve problems, yet only chim-
panzees profit from tool use in the wild. Does this
imply a tool-using common ape ancestor, or that the
understanding of object properties required for tool
use was originally selected for in the context of other
tasks? This is a question to which I shall return.
Great apes have and use knowledge about
physical events and objects, but according to Byrne
they treat other animals differently: they have a
'theory of mind'. In other words, great apes attribute
mental states to other individuals, and to varying
degrees act according to what they think those indi-
viduals think. Understanding others involves com-
prehending what they know and appreciating that
their goals and intentions may be different. It seems
likely that both require a distinction between other
and self. Self-recognition in a mirror is the classic
test for whether an animal has a self-concept. On the
basis of current experimental evidence Byrne sug-
gests that all great apes, but not monkeys, have the
potential to understand whether reflections in mir-
rors are of themselves: whether they actually do may
be dependent on developmental circumstances. More
direct experimental evidence for mental state attri-
bution is limited to chimpanzees. At least some chim-
panzees can reliably pick which of two human
helpers knows where food has been hidden, sug-
gesting comprehension of others' knowledge. And
at least one chimpanzee has shown understanding
of the difference between accident and deliberate
malice, a result which if replicated would suggest
that chimpanzees can judge intentions, at least of
humans in experiments.
In addition to experimental evidence Byrne also
presents anecdotal evidence that the great apes have
a theory of mind. He suggests that having a theory
of mind is useful because it allows one to alter other
individuals' beliefs, and consequently he discusses
the anecdotal evidence for tactical deception and teach-
ing. Crucially though, it is only intentional deception
and intentional teaching which provide evidence for
a theory of mind. Both monkeys and apes practise
tactical deception: they employ acts from their nor-
mal repertoire in such a manner that another indi-
vidual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify,
to the advantage of the deceiver. According to Byrne,
however, only great apes intentionally deceive, that
is, know that they have made the dupe believe some-
thing untrue. Similarly, although teaching has been
claimed for several primate species, only chimpan-
zees have been observed to behave in ways that
suggest an intention to change the knowledge on which
the learner's behaviour is based (and even then the
evidence for intentional teaching of nut-cracking
seems rather weak given that it apparently (Boesch
1991) takes the novice ten years to become fully pro-
ficient).
The argument that great apes have a theory of
mind is contentious. Heyes (1993, 177) has argued
that none of the existing evidence for attribution of a
mental state to an interactant is sufficiently robust to
rule out explanations based on associative or infer-
ential learning about observable properties of the
interactant's appearance or behaviour. Heyes, how-
ever, does not argue that apes do not attribute men-
tal states — only that it is not proven that they do. I
accept the logic of Heyes' argument, but suspect that
Byrne's claim for a theory of mind will ultimately
prove correct even if some of the evidence he presents
has not been correctly interpreted. If one accepts that
great apes do have the mental capacity to manipu-
late others by changing their knowledge, and indeed
to use objects to solve problems, then it is reasonable
to suggest, as Byrne does, that there is a sense in
which they can think. Such activities involve simu-
lating or computing outcomes without performing
them, and Byrne asks whether this ability is more
widely used to imagine future states of the world in
general. His answer is, effectively, no: the evidence
for anticipatory planning, that is, forethought not
related to current motivational state, is flimsy. Given
that mental state attribution is widely regarded as a
prerequisite for language, Byrne also asks how far
great apes can be helped to achieve linguistic com-
munication. His thesis is that although spoken lan-
guage requires specific biological adaptations, such
as precision motor control of the tongue and
superlaryngeal tract, language itself is a matter of
software: programmes which even an ape might have
sufficient brain hardware to run. Although great apes
do not naturally acquire language, chimpanzees and
to a lesser extent orang-utans and gorillas can use it;
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they understand and use the concept of reference,
and use words for real communication. They do not,
however, acquire much in the way of syntax or gram-
mar, and even chimpanzees' abilities are limited to
those of young (two-year-old) children.
Even if great ape 'thinking' is limited by hu-
man standards, it marks a significant discontinuity
between monkeys and apes. This is perhaps the most
striking message of The Thinking Ape. While mon-
keys can learn fast enough to appear clever in their
environmental and social interactions, only the great
apes can be considered truly insightful. Byrne maps
these differences in intelligence onto the evolution-
ary history established in Chapter 2, and then by
'reversing' cladistic analysis proposes an evolution-
ary taxonomy of primate intelligence. He suggests
that the earliest primate species for which we have
modern descendants available to study, the lemur/
human ancestor, was small-brained and no more
intelligent or socially sophisticated than other mam-
mals. The monkeys and apes represent an important
quantitative shift from the primitive condition. The
monkey/human ancestor was group-living and pos-
sessed a larger neocortex of the brain. Byrne concurs
with the increasing consensus that larger neocortex
is an adaptive response to the increased social com-
plexity of living in semi-permanent groups. He rather
elegantly supports existing arguments by demon-
strating that the ratio of neocortex to brain is closely
related to the frequency with which members of a
species practice deception. Insightless social intelli-
gence is most developed in Old World open-country
monkeys (such as Baboons), where it underwrites
the social skills required to maintain complex alli-
ances. Byrne suggests that the final shift to great ape
intelligence is qualitative rather than quantitative.
The capacity for insight is not obviously related to
brain size: the only measure that completely sets the
great apes apart from monkeys is raw weight of
cortex, and this differs among apes in ways unre-
lated to any measure of behavioural complexity. On
this basis Byrne supposes that some more subtle,
organizational brain change must have occurred with
the common great ape ancestor.
Byrne's attempt to account for the increased
intelligence of the great apes is particularly relevant
for palaeoanthropologists who wish to understand
the starting point of distinctly human evolution. All
great apes, and it follows the first hominid, could
'mentally represent and conjure with other "possible
worlds'", whether they be the thoughts of other ani-
mals, the uses of novel objects, or the solutions to
current problems. Byrne doubts that these abilities
are the result of further social selection pressures of
the sort that drove monkey/ape evolution since it is
unclear what additional social pressures apes face.
Instead he suggests that environmental challenges
were more important. His list of possible candidates
includes
the need to use and learn complex programmes of
manual action, in which imitation and teaching
would help; locomotor problems, in which advance
calculations about the self would help; hunting large
mammals, in which anticipation of future actions
of prey and companions would help; tool use and
tool-making ... in which symbolic representation
of object properties and the ability to imagine un-
seen objects would help. (p. 232)
We presently lack enough information about early
ape locomotion to understand what selective pres-
sures it may have posed for ape cognition. Of the
remaining candidates, I suspect we can rule out hunt-
ing large mammals and tool use and tool-making.
Among extant great apes only humans hunt large
mammals so it seems unlikely that this is a primitive
behaviour. Perhaps more importantly, it is not clear
that anticipation (the specific selective pressure pro-
posed by Byrne) is a significant feature of chimpan-
zee hunting (Stanford 1996), and indeed Byrne
himself is of the view that the evidence for anticipa-
tory planning in any domain is generally flimsy. In
contrast, there is no doubt that all great apes can
make and use tools. The problem here is that only
chimpanzees (and humans) routinely profit from tool
use in the wild and a behaviour that is seldom prac-
tised (unless it is in some way critical) is unlikely to
provide a strong selective pressure. Byrne notes that
comparison between tool use by wild chimpanzees
and that by other apes in captivity is complicated by
the fact that wild chimpanzee tool use has a compo-
nent of social tradition. There is some evidence that
social insight may play at least as great a role in
chimpanzee tool use as insight about objects. If chim-
panzees have a particularly developed ability to think
about mechanical relations then one might expect
their material culture to show greater innovation
than it does (Tomasello et ah 1993); instead, much of
wild chimpanzee tool use can probably be attributed
to application of the social insight required for imita-
tion, and this might also be true for the complex leaf-
folding techniques of gorillas. I suspect that the chief
selective pressure for ancestral ape insight was a
continued need to better anticipate and manipulate
the behaviour of conspecifics, and this was answered
by the ability to attribute mental states. If ape tool
use is largely maintained, or, in the case of trained
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captive animals, initiated by imitation, then it may
be an epiphenomenal consequence of mental state
attribution.
The thinking ape described by Byrne is the start-
ing point for human cognitive evolution. Using the
comparative method, Byrne has traced the evolution
of the social skills that underpin what it is to be a
great ape, humans included. It is the task of palaeo-
anthropologists to document and explain the evolu-
tion of the traits which separate humans from the
other great apes. Principal among these are language,
more sophisticated tool-making, more complex in-
teraction with the natural environment, and greater
awareness of past and future. Making inferences about
such traits is fraught with difficulty, indeed, accord-
ing to Byrne, impossible. His main objection to palaeo-
anthropological endeavour is that it is not founded
on an experimental method, and so the story of hu-
man evolution changes with each chance discovery.
If palaeoanthropology is more vulnerable in this re-
spect than any other historical science then it is surely
as much due to a lack of bold theorizing as any con-
straint inherent in the subject matter: a reason for
renewed vigour rather than acceptance of defeat.
In any case, science is rarely easy. Even the
comparative method is not without its problems.
Experimental data from captive chimpanzees may
be more robust than anecdotal evidence from the
wild, but the evolutionary significance of specific
abilities depends on the use to which they are actu-
ally put. It may be possible to improve the quality of
anecdotal evidence, but in practice, funding con-
straints and other contingencies are likely to inter-
vene; and there is always the possibility that the
increased access required to improve anecdotal evi-
dence will change the nature or frequency of the
observed behaviour — a biological version of
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. That said, it re-
mains true that Byrne has told us more about the
intelligence of the great ape/human ancestor than
we could hope to learn from the fossil record, but the
fact that he can say nothing about the evolution of
specifically human traits does not preclude others
from making an attempt. Tlte Hunting Ape is the
natural starting point.
Mark Lake
Department of Archaeology
University of Reading
Whiteknights
P.O. Box 218
Reading
RG6 6AA
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